By Christina Pushaw, TES Contributor
With Vladimir Zelensky’s landslide win in Ukraine’s presidential runoff on April 22, Ukraine appears more united than ever. The political newcomer, who plays a fictional president in a popular TV series, beat incumbent Petro Poroshenko — among voters of every age group and all but one of the country’s administrative regions — by a record-high margin of nearly 50 points. All signs point to a milestone for a young democracy: A peaceful transition of power. Despite the Kremlin’s best efforts, Ukrainians have again rejected Russian-style autocracy.
But the real challenge for Zelensky lies ahead. As Poroshenko’s term draws to a close, Ukraine’s economy is the about the size of Puerto Rico’s – though Ukraine’s population is ten times greater. While Ukraine became the poorest country in Europe, Poroshenko’s personal wealth increased dramatically during his presidency. Though Poroshenko claimed to be campaigning against Putin, the Kremlin was comfortable with the status quo. As long as Ukraine is an impoverished kleptocracy, it cannot provide a positive example of democracy to inspire Putin’s constituents.
To succeed where his predecessor failed, Zelensky must follow through on his mandate to fight corruption. The 13.5 million ballots cast for Zelensky were not mere “protest votes” nor demands for ill-defined change. They were an affront to the Ukrainian elites who make Putin’s job easier — or even do his dirty work for him. Building the institutions of a state without eradicating the corruption and cronyism endemic to the post-Soviet system is no less futile than building a house on a foundation of quicksand.
Yet some still claim the president-elect may be Moscow’s project. They cite favorable coverage of Zelensky — and endless mockery of Poroshenko — in Kremlin-backed media, as well as perceived endorsements from Russian political figures. But it would be a mistake to take positive coverage of Zelensky in Russia at face value. As Moscow’s hybrid war drags into its sixth year, Ukrainian public opinion is, understandably, far from Kremlin-friendly. Putin understands that vocal backing from Russia is no ratings booster for a national political figure in Ukraine.
In the days since the election, Putin has again attempted to manipulate the Ukrainian public through insincere “shows of support” for pro-Western leaders. At a press conference last week, he called on Zelensky to restore the Ukrainian citizenship of Mikheil Saakashvili. The former Odessa governor, who was deported after launching a protest movement against Poroshenko, is certainly no friend of Putin. As president of Georgia from 2004 to 2012, Saakashvili emerged as a world-renowned reformer — and thus, the Russian president’s enemy number one. (In 2008, Moscow even launched a conventional invasion of Georgia in an attempt to depose him.)
Saakashvili is now waging a legal battle to reverse Poroshenko’s unlawful decision to strip him of Ukrainian citizenship, rendering him stateless. More than likely, Putin is worried that Zelensky might allow Saakashvili to return to Ukrainian politics in some capacity. In urging Zelensky, albeit sarcastically, to restore Saakashvili’s citizenship, Putin anticipates the Ukrainian president-elect will do the opposite. Putin’s facetious endorsement of Saakashvili’s cause is his latest ploy to sow discord in Ukraine, while weakening the position of pro-Western politicians he views as threats.
In short, Putin’s goal in Ukraine is the same as it is around the world: To exploit the discord that exists in pluralistic societies, turn people against one another, and erode voters’ faith in democratic institutions. The more chaotic foreign democracies become, the stronger Putin’s autocracy appears by comparison.
Perhaps nowhere is this more relevant than in Ukraine. If a country that Russia considers its wayward little brother succeeds in becoming a modern, prosperous, and democratic European state, perhaps Russians will demand the same at home. And this is the only real threat to Putin’s regime. For his own political survival, Putin needs a divided Ukraine. But an opposition candidate winning nearly three-quarters of the electorate telegraphs unity.
In other words, to preserve his own regime, Putin needs Zelensky to fail. Putin needs Zelensky to preside over a Ukraine in which corruption continues to flourish, the economy continues to stagnate, and pro-growth reforms continue to falter — just as under Poroshenko.
But the Kremlin cannot maintain the dysfunctional status quo by force. To neutralize the emerging threat of a functional Ukraine, Putin and his cronies will likely work with Ukraine’s oligarch class to ensure the inexperienced Zelensky faces a rabid group of domestic opponents. These dissenters will not be overtly pro-Russian — to gain the public’s trust, they must appear to be the opposite. Disguised as Ukrainian patriots, they will push fake narratives and fabricated kompromat, just as Poroshenko did throughout the campaign. And they will stop at nothing to destroy not only Zelensky, but Ukrainians’ faith in democracy.
The only way to resist such influence operations is to recognize them for what they are. Thus, as Ukraine opens the next chapter of its democratic development, supporters of democracy worldwide must be more vigilant than ever.
Christina Pushaw is a Washington, D.C.-based analyst who specializes in Eastern European politics. She is an M.A. graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has worked as an advisor to Georgia’s leading opposition party
